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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GALEN CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
MACK A. MUNNS, GREGORY C. 
MARBLE; DEE M. MARBLE, BOYD 
MARBLE, RANDY MARBLE, and 
CHERYL MARBLE, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
BRIEF 
CASE NO. 900233-CA 
COME NOW the Defendants/Appellants, Mack A. Munns, Gregory C. 
Marble, Dee M. Marble, Boyd Marble, Randy Marble, and Cheryl 
Marble, and submit the following Brief in the above entitled case. 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE AND JURISDICTION 
The case below was an action to recover on a Promissory Note. 
This appeal is from the First Judicial District Court's Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment for the Plaintiff/Respondent 
against the Defendants/Appellants. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah had jurisdiction of 
this appeal pursuant to 78-2-2(3)(j) Utah Code Annotated 1953 As 
Amended. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah transferred this 
case to the Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals therefore has 
jurisdiction pursuant to 78-2a-3(j) Utah Code Annotated 1953 As 
Amended. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the promissory note provide for compounded interest? 
2. Was the Judgment for attorney's fees supported by the 
evidence? 
3. Did the Respondent deliver to the Appellants the 
consideration agreed upon for the promissory note? 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Disposition of this case does not require interpretation of 
any constitutional provisions, statutes, rules or regulations. 
IV. STATEMENT OF CASE 
1. Nature and Disposition in the District Court. 
The Respondent brought this action in the First Judicial 
District Court in and for Box Elder County, State of Utah to 
recover the balance due and owing on a Promissory Note made by the 
Appellants. At trial, the Respondent claimed a balance owing on 
said Promissory Note based upon compounding interest. The District 
Court, the Honorable F. L. Gunnell, District Judge, without a jury, 
ruled that the balance due should be based on compounded interest 
and directed the parties at the close of the evidence to calculate 
the balance and agree upon the same based on compounded interest. 
The District Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Judgment entered on the 24th day of October, 1989 states the 
principal and interest balance based on daily compounding of 
interest. 
The Appellants asserted at trial failure of the Respondent to 
deliver all of the consideration for the Promissory Note as a 
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defense to any balance owing under the Promissory Note. The 
District Court disallowed said claim. 
The District Court also granted the Respondent judgment 
against the Appellants for attorney's fees pursuant to testimony of 
the Respondent's attorney. 
2. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
The Appellants made a Promissory Note dated March 26, 1981 in 
favor of the Respondent. [See Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3, Appendix 
No. 2.] The Promissory Note was for the purchase of a 1978 
Fruehauf Semi-Trailer, as noted on the Promissory Note. 
The Respondent did not retain any security interest in the 
trailer to secure payment of the Promissory Note. [See transcript, 
P. 15 - P. 18.] The Appellants did not make the payments on the 
Promissory Note when due. The Appellants made payments on the 
dates as set forth in Paragraph No. 4 of the Court's Findings of 
Fact. [See Appendix No. 1.] 
At the date of trial, the Respondent had not yet delivered the 
trailer title to the Appellants, although he had been requested to 
do so. Subsequent to the date of the Promissory Note, probably in 
1984, the Respondent had pledged the trailer title to First 
Security Bank and in 1988 had transferred to the trailer title to 
Harris Truck and Equipment Company. It was later re-transferred 
back to the Respondent. [See transcript P. 21 - P. 23.] At the 
conclusions of the evidence and after Respondent's attorney, in 
closing argument, had claimed compounded interest, the Court ruled 
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that the Promissory Note does provide for compounded interest. 
[See Transcript P. 77, L. 25 - P. 78 L. 2.] 
The Court also ruled that the Respondent's failure to deliver 
the trailer title to the Appellants was not a failure to deliver 
consideration for the Promissory Note. [See Transcript P. 76 L. 8 
- P. 77 L. 9.] 
The Respondent's attorney called himself as a witness to 
present evidence to justify the Court's award of attorney's fees. 
The award of attorney's fees was based solely upon said evidence. 
[See transcript, P. 23 L. 18 - P. 26 L. 18.] 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The evidence does not support the Court's ruling that 
interest on the Promissory Note should be compounded. Compounded 
interest is not favored under the law and the burden of 
establishing an agreement for compound interest was upon the 
Respondent at trial. The only evidence presented regarding 
the terms of the Promissory Note in regard to interest was the note 
itself, which does not support a ruling for compound interest. 
2. The Respondent's failure to deliver title to the trailer 
purchased by the Appellants was clearly a failure to deliver the 
consideration to be received by the Appellants for the Promissory 
Note. 
3. The evidence presented at trial does not support the 
Court's award of attorney's fees. 
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VI. ARGUMENT 
Point I. THE COURT'S RULING THAT THE PROMISSORY NOTE PROVIDES 
FOR COMPOUNDED INTEREST IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
In this case, the method of computing interest is of prime 
concern. The Appellants presented evidence at trial regarding 
computation of the balance on a simple interest basis. The Court 
rejected said computation. [See Transcript P. 78 L. 2 - L. 5.] 
The Court ruled that the "Promissory Note does provide for 
compounded interest", but did not provide the period of 
compounding, whether it be daily, monthly, yearly or any other 
period, and simply directed counsel to arrive at a balance based on 
compounded interest. 
It should be first noted that compounding interest is 
distinguished from allowing interest on past due installments of 
interest. See: Jensen v Lichenstein, 45 Utah 2d, 320, 145 P. 1036 
(1915); Farnsworth v Jensen, 217 P.2d 577 (Utah 1950); 
45 Am Jur 2d, Interest and Useries, Sec. 76 states: 
"Compound interest means interest on interest in that 
accrued interest is added periodically to the principal 
and interest is computed upon the new principal thus 
formed." 
The compounding of interest is not favored by the law. See: 
Mountain States Broadcasting v Nagel, 776 P.2d 643 (Utah App 1989); 
Watkins and Faber v. Whitely, 592 P.2d 613 (Utah 1979) ; Farnsv/orth 
v Jensen, Supra, Jensen v Lichenstein, Supra. 
45 Am Jury 2d, Interest and Usery Sec. 76 further states: 
"From an early day, the courts both in England and in 
this country have been opposed to the allowance of 
-5-
compound interest and the generally recognized rule is 
that interest should not bear interest," 
There is additionally some question whether an agreement 
between the parties for compounded interest is void, and under what 
circumstance such an agreement would be valid. 45 Am Jur 2d, 
Interest and Usery, Sec 77 states as follows: 
"The courts are not agreed whether an agreement to charge 
compounded interest is invalid on the grounds of public 
policy* According to one line of authorities, an 
agreement to pay interest on interest is not invalid on 
this ground whether the agreement is made before or after 
the interest falls due, and of course, an agreement for 
compound interest is valid if it is authorized by 
statute. On the other hand, many authorities hold that 
such an agreement is invalid if made at the time of the 
loan or before interest is due, but if it is supported by 
sufficient consideration and it is not prohibited by 
statute it is valid if made after interest falls due." 
However, in this case it is not necessary for the court to 
determine the validity of an agreement for compound interest. The 
only evidence presented in regard to compounding interest is the 
face of the Promissory Note, which is attached as Appendix No. 2. 
Clearly the note does not provide for compounding interest, in fact 
the first interest payment due would appear to be on October 15, 
1981. The court's ruling clearly was not supported by the evidence 
in this case. In addition, the court did not make any 
determination of the period for compounding, whether it should have 
been daily, weekly, monthly or annually. 
Point II. THE RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO DELIVER THE TRAILER 
TITLE TO THE APPELLANT WAS A FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION FOR THE 
PROMISSORY NOTE. 
It is not in dispute that the Promissory Note in this case was 
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APPENDIX #1 
Steven C. Vanderlinden (3314) 
of VANDERLINDEN AND COLTON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1133 North Main, Suite 200 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Telephone (801) 544-9930 
BRIGHT ^STRICT 
toJ| 3 31 W 'B3 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GALEN CHRISTENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MACK A. MUNNS, GREGORY C. 
MARBLE, DEE M. MARBLE, BOYD 
MARBLE, RANDY MARBLE, and 
CHERYL MARBLE, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 880000553 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for Trial on the 
26th day of June, 1989, before the Honorable F. L. Gunnell, 
District Court Judge. The Plaintiff appeared in person and was 
represented by Steven C. Vanderlinden. The Defendants Boyd Marble 
and Gregory C. Marble appeared in person and Jack H. Molgard 
appeared and represented all the Defendants. The Court having seen 
the evidence and having heard testimony of witnesses and arguments 
by counsel, and good cause appearing now enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Plaintiff and Defendant are residents of Box Elder 
County, Utah. 
M IC R O h , L M „ D 
I W > J'fltoll No. .>-
Case No. 
OCT 2 4 \W 
By 
2. That the Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a 
promissory note whereby the Defendants agreed to pay the sum of 
$8,200.00, and Plaintiff in turn gave Defendants a 1978 Fruehauf 
Trailer. 
3. That said note was to bear interest at prime interest 
plus 3% per anum, with the last payment due October 15, 1981. 
4. That Defendant paid the following towards principal and 
interest: 
September 4, 1981 $3,000.00 
July 27, 1983 $1,500.00 
August 31, 1983 $1,000.00 
October 12, 1983 $1,500.00 
October 31, 1983 $1,000.00 
July 12, 1984 $1,153.00 
5. That Defendant defaulted on the payment of said 
promissory note. 
6. That the amount of principal and interest due on said 
note as of June 16, 1989, is $5,194.93. 
7. That Defendant agreed to pay a reasonable attorney fee 
and court costs if this matter was contested. 
The court having entered its Findings of Fact hereby enters 
its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That Plaintiff is entitled to Judgment against the 
Defendants, and each of them, in the sum of $6,069.95, as of June 
26, 1989, with interest thereon at 12% per anum, computed as 
follows, $5,194.93 principal and interest, $800.00 attorney fee, 
$75.00 filing fee. 
Based on the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
the court now renders its:* 
-2-
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff is 
granted judgment against Mack A. Munns, Gregory C. Marble, Dee M. 
Marble, Boyd Marble, Randy Marble and Cheryl Marble, and each of 
them, for the principal and interest amount of $5,194.93, attorney 
fees in the amount of $800.00, filing fees of $75.00 for a total 
judgment of $6,069.93, plus post judgment collection costs should 
they arise in the due course of execution, and interest on said 
judgment from June 26, 1989 at 12% per anum. 
By the Court: 
tub ^ ^ > ^ / ^ D I $ T R I C T COURT JUDGE 
NOTICE 
TO: Jack Molgard 
Attorney for Defendants 
102 South First West 
P. 0. Box 461 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
You are hereby notified pursuant to Rule 4.504 that you have 
5 days after reciept of these pleadings to file any objection to 
their form. 
DATED this / 2- day of OCho^A. 
^TEJVEN/C. VANDERL1ND2N * 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Document on this 2~Q day of &cJx>i-^i , 1989, by 
first class, U.S. mail, postage prepaid upon: 
.Jack Molgard 
102 South First West 
P. 0. Box 461 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 /- ^ 
C L / I - ( ' , \/l ^' A -> tc c 
LEGAL SfiCROTARY ' 
APPENDIX #2 
H'ac A. Munns 
200.00 
„.
 r CJregory C. Marble Chanshare I n c . D e s „ M a r b l e 
Boyd, Randy, & Cheryl Marble 
March 26 19 81 
. .AFTER DATE FOR V A L U E RECEIVED I WE OR EITHER OF U 
PROMISE TO 
PAY TO THE ORDER O F . Gaylen Christensen 
Eight Thousand Two Hunderd and no/100- 1DOLLAR 
IN L A W F U L MONEY OF THE U N I T E D STATES OF AMERICA 
W I T H INTEREST T H E R E O N IN L I K E MONEY AT T H E RATE OF P r X t t i e *** 3 P E R CENT PER A N N U M ( INTEREST COMPUTED ON THE BASIS OF 
3 6 0 DAY YEAR AND A C T U A L DAYS ELAPSED) P A Y A B L E FROM „. 
U N T I L MATURITY AND THEREAFTER AT THE RATE OF p E R CENT PER A N N U M U N T I L F A I D AND IT NOT PAID AT MATURITY AND T l H 
NOTE BE PLACED W T H AN ATTORNEY FOR C O L L E C T I O N OR IF SUIT BE INST ITUTED FOR ITS C O L L E C T I O N I WE OR EITHER OF US AGREE T 
PAY IN EITHER CASE R E A S O N A B L E ATTORNEY S FEES THE MAKERS S U R t ^ l C ^ GUARANTORS AND ENDORSERS HEREOF SEVERALLY W A U 
PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT PROTEST NOTICE OF PROTEST AND OF NON PAYJ4ENT OF THIS NOTE IF THF INTEREST ON T H I S NOTE IS NOT PAi 
AT THE T IME IT BECOMES DUE THE HOLDER OF T H I S NOTE AT ITS O P T I O N M > Y D E C L A R & j T H F W H O L E , DUE AND PAYABLE 
1978 Fruehauf trailer s/n FWZ263501 
E: August 15, 1981 -- $3,000.00 
October 15, 1981 — Balance 
+ in te res t H'AL^/MM '<Wf<eg!fm m 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED I WE OR EITMteS? OF US HEREBY W A I V E 
PRESENTMENT? DEMAND OF PAYMENT PROTEST AND NOTICE OF N O N -
PAYMENT OR OF PROTEST AND FURTHER AGREE ^O T H E TERMS AND C O N -
DITIONS OF AtX. OF T H E OBt-lGATIONS ENTERED INTO BY T H E MAKER OF 
T H E W I T H I N NOTE AND W A I V E ALL DEMANDS NOTICES AND ADVERTISE-
MENTS AND NOTICE OF ANY SUBSTITUT ION OR CHANGE I N SECURITY AND 
CONSENT TO ANY EXTENSION OF T I M E OF PAYMENT OR ANY RENEWAL OF 
T H I S NOTE AND HEREBY GUARANTEE T H E PERFORMANCE OF ALL T H E 
PROMISES ENTERED INTO T H E R E I N BY T H E M A K E R OF T H E W I T H I N NOTE 
ALSO AGREE TO PAY REASONABLE ATTORNEY S F E E IF S U I T IS BROUGHT 
HEREON OR ON W I T H I N NOTE OR IF TH IS NOTE IS PLACED I N T H E HANDS 
OF AN ATTORNEY FOR COLLECTION 
DATED THIS DAY OF 19 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The court should remand this case back to the District Court 
for determination of the balance owing on the Promissory Note based 
on a simple interest calculation, further determining that although 
interest on the unpaid interest installments may be charged, it 
should only be charged from the due date to the date of judgment at 
the legal rate, as provided under Utah Law, and after the date of 
judgment, only at the legal rate provided under Utah Law. 
The court should further remand the case back to the District 
Court to make a determination of the damages sustained by the 
Appellants as a result of the Respondent's failure to deliver the 
agreed upon consideration, i.e. the title to the trailer, and to 
determine an appropriate remedy therefore. 
This court should further reverse the award of attorney's 
fees. 
Respectfully submitted this /^clay of September, 1990. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing document to:Steven C. Vanderlinden, 1133 North Main, 
Suite 200, Layton, UT 84041. 
Dated this y ^ & a y of ^^fr.;?/*/ , 1990. 
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